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ARE THERE LONG-TERM EARNINGS SCARS FROM YOUTH
UNEMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY?
JOACHIM MO¨LLER1,2,3 AND MATTHIAS UMKEHRER1,4
We analyze the relationship between early-career unemployment and prime-age earnings with
German administrative linked employer-employee data. The careers of more than 720,000 male
apprenticeship graduates from the cohorts of 1978 to 1980 are followed over 24 years. On average,
early-career unemployment has substantial negative effects on earnings accumulated later in life.
An identification strategy based on plant closure of the training firm at the time of graduation
suggests that the revealed correlation is not the result of unobserved heterogeneity. Scarring effects
also vary considerably across the earnings distribution. Workers with a high earnings potential are
able to offset adverse consequences of early-career unemployment to a large extent. Workers who
are located at the bottom of the prime-age earnings distribution, in contrast, suffer substantial
and persistent losses. Our findings imply that a policy with the aim of preventing early-career
unemployment would have long-lasting beneficial effects on future earnings.
KEYWORDS: Scarring, state dependence, youth unemployment.
JEL-CLASSIFICATION: J30, J69, C21, C26.
1. INTRODUCTION
Young workers are generally more susceptible to become unemployed than experi-
enced workers [cf. Farber (1993)]. At the OECD average, the unemployment rate among
the 15 to 24 year old is about twice the general rate (Table I). Moreover, unemployment
rates have reached a worryingly high level in the aftermath of the great recession, par-
ticularly among youth. This is the case in most European countries and in the U.S. In
Germany, in contrast, unemployment has declined between the years 2006 and 2012.
Youth unemployment is only about half the OECD rate and the ratio of youth unem-
ployment to total unemployment is lower than in other countries. However, also here
youth unemployment is elevated and the ratio slightly increased since 2006.
The relatively favorable situation in the German case is related to at least three fac-
tors. First, youth unemployment responds sensitively to a general under-utilization of
the labor force in times of economic crisis. Compared to other countries, Germany has
been able to surmount the dramatic demand shock of the Great Recession in a surpris-
ingly short time and experienced a substantial employment increase in the aftermath of
the crisis [cf. Mo¨ller (2010)]. Second, the German system of vocational training is suc-
cessful in preparing young workers for their further professional life. And last but not
least, youth unemployment was always of great concern in German active labor market
policy. The emphasis laid on the labor market situation of young workers is also the
merit of leading labor economists like Wolfgang Franz who scrutinized not only the
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particularities of the labor market situation for young workers but also warned against
the severe long-run consequences of joblessness at the beginning of a professional ca-
reer [cf. Franz (1981), Franz, Inkmann, Pohlmeier and Zimmermann (1997) or Franz
and Zimmermann (2002)].
TABLE I
AGGREGATE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (IN PERCENT)
OECD Germany U.S. France Italy Greece Spain
2006
aged 15-24 12.5 13.8 10.5 21.7 21.6 25.2 17.9
all persons 6.1 10.3 4.6 8.8 6.8 8.9 8.5
ratio 2.1 1.3 2.3 2.5 3.2 2.8 2.1
2012
aged 15-24 16.2 8.2 16.2 23.8 35.2 55.3 53.2
all persons 7.9 5.5 8.1 9.9 10.7 24.2 25.0
ratio 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.4 3.3 2.3 2.1
Source: OECD (2014)
Our article stands in this tradition. Starting from the fact that young workers’ wages
are also particularly vulnerable to adverse economic shocks [cf. Blanchflower and Os-
wald (1994)], we ask whether unemployment experienced at an early stage of the career
reduces total earnings accumulated during an established part of the professional his-
tory.
As outlined by Heckman and Borjas (1980), a structural link between (youth) unem-
ployment and later labor market outcomes may exist if, for instance, individuals loose
productivity-enhancing work experience during unemployment periods or if prospec-
tive employers refer information about an individual’s productivity from unemployment
records when making hiring and investment decisions. Alternatively, young workers
might be able to offset adverse consequences of unemployment during the course of the
early career, which is generally characterized by a high degree of job mobility and rapid
wage growth [cf. Topel and Ward (1992)]. Consequently, it remains an empirical ques-
tion whether or not youth unemployment involves longer-term earnings losses. If future
earnings truly depend on the state of unemployment during the early career this would
call for policy measures aiming at the prevention of youth unemployment in order to
avoid future earnings loss.
Our empirical strategy focuses on German males who graduated from Germany’s
dual apprenticeship system between the years 1978 and 1980. This relatively homoge-
nous and quantitatively important group enters the German labor market under similar
economic conditions.1 What makes it an interesting case to study is that it experiences
the severe recession in the aftermath of the second oil price shock at the beginning of
professional life.
1Around 60 percent of a cohort enter the German labor market through the dual apprenticeship sys-
tem. This system combines apprenticeship training with a company and vocational education at school, see
Hippach-Schneider, Krause and Woll (2007) for a detailed description.
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Our administrative data set, the Integrated Employment Biographies [IEB, cf. Ober-
schachtsiek, Scioch, Seysen and Heining (2009)] provided by the Institute for Employ-
ment Research (IAB) in Nuremberg, Germany, allows us to observe the complete em-
ployment biographies of all of these individuals starting with their first day of training.
Following Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013), we define the early career as the period be-
tween the end of apprenticeship training and the end of the eighth year that has passed
since graduation. The subsequent 16 years of potential experience are defined as prime
age.2 We aim at investigating whether unemployment experienced during early career
has negative effects on the distribution of earnings from employment subject to social
security contributions accumulated during prime age.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, controlling for initial sorting into training
firms by including training firm fixed effects, show an effect of early-career unem-
ployment which is both statistically and economically significant: The estimated semi-
elasticity of prime-age earnings with respect to early-career unemployment evaluated
at one standard deviation of early-career unemployment (326 days) is −24.9 percent.
Other things being equal, this estimate would imply that experiencing joblessness for
about one year during the first eight years in the labor market reduces average earnings
in the following 16 years by roughly one quarter.
To solve the potential problem of adverse selection and voluntary mobility, outlined
in detail by von Wachter and Bender (2006), we use plant closure of the training firm
occurring in the year of graduation as an instrument for early-career unemployment.
With respect to random assignment of the instrument, Hamermesh (1987) demonstrates
that a plant closure is hardly predictable by the workers who are affected. This view
is supported by Ruhm (1991) or Dustmann and Meghir (2005) who show that wage
changes induced by plant closures do not become visible earlier than two calendar years
in advance. Consequently, after having controlled for sorting between training firms, we
should be able to assure ignorable assignment of the instrument by focusing on those
apprentices who have spent at least two years of training with the firm before it closes
down.3
We further assume that the exclusion restriction holds because, in the presence of
changing economic conditions, human capital accumulation, and early-career matching
processes, the disruption in the employment process is most likely to be the only per-
sistent link between an exogenous and transitory labor demand shock at the transition
from training to work and the level of earnings after at least nine years of potential ex-
perience.4 The instrumental variable (IV) estimates suggest that our OLS estimates of
2The reason behind this cut-off of the early career and prime age is that the first years in the labor market are
subject to an adjustment process, characterized by high job mobility and temporarily elevated unemployment.
Judging from Appendix 8.3 of Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013), this adjustment process lasts approximately
eight years.
3Sorting between training firms based on the likelihood of a plant closure turns out to be an important con-
founding factor. Since a person’s later mobility might already be influenced by early-career unemployment,
among other things, controlling for sorting becomes a considerably more complex task once workers have
entered the labor market. For this reason, we focus on plant closure of the training firm occurring in the year
of graduation.
4Since exclusion of initial plant closure from the second stage regression is a critical assumption we will
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the scarring effect of early-career unemployment on prime-age earnings are not sub-
stantially biased upwards.
Furthermore, when we allow the effects of early-career unemployment to vary across
the unconditional distribution of prime-age earnings, we find that the impact of early-
career unemployment is highly heterogeneous: The effects on the first decile are more
than ten times larger than the effects on the ninth decile. This pattern suggests that
workers with a high earnings potential have characteristics which allow them to offset
the adverse consequences of early-career unemployment to a certain extent. By contrast,
workers with a low earnings potential suffer substantial earnings losses from early-
career unemployment.
Our study is associated with the broad literature on state dependence between past
unemployment experiences and future labor market outcomes. Previous studies for
the labor market in the U.S. give little evidence for the assertion that past unemploy-
ment causes future unemployment [cf. Heckman and Borjas (1980); Corcoran and Hill
(1985)]. The German literature reveals stronger scarring effects of this type in general
settings [cf. Mu¨hleisen and Zimmermann (1994); Biewen and Steffes (2010); Niedergesa¨ss
(2012)]. Particularly youth unemployment is frequently found to entail permanent em-
ployment and/or wage losses. In the U.S., the impact of youth unemployment appears
to be mainly on future wages [cf. Ellwood (1982); Mroz and Savage (2006)]. The Eu-
ropean literature, in contrast, reports both negative wage and employment effects [cf.
Nilsen and Reiso (2011) and Nordstro¨m Skans (2011) for Norway; Arulampalam, Booth
and Taylor (2000), Arulampalam (2001), Gregg (2001), and Gregg and Tominey (2005)
for Great Britain; or Ryan (2001) for a cross-national comparison]. For Germany, there
is still comparatively little research on long-term consequences of youth unemployment.
One exception is the study by Franz, Inkmann, Pohlmeier and Zimmermann (1997)
who provide evidence that dropping out of apprenticeship training can permanently re-
duce subsequent earnings. To contribute to the existing literature, we extend the study
by Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013) by analyzing the earnings effects of early-career
unemployment from a long-term perspective. The latter study finds that in Germany
early-career unemployment leads to more unemployment later in life.
The article proceeds as follows: The next two sections introduce our data set and
describe our key variables. Section 4 outlines conceptual considerations while Section 5
presents and interprets the regression results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. DATA AND VARIABLES
Our empirical analysis focuses on all male German workers who graduated from
the dual apprenticeship system in Western Germany. We study this particular group of
workers because, on the one hand, its members are comparatively homogenous concern-
ing background, training, and career prospects. Still, apprenticeship graduates are quan-
titatively the most important group in the German labor market. On the other hand, our
administrative data set, the Integrated Employment Biographies [IEB, cf. Oberschacht-
address it in detail in Section 5.2.2.
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siek, Scioch, Seysen and Heining (2009)] of the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB) in Nuremberg, Germany, provides us with detailed information on labor market
states such as apprenticeship training, employment subject to social security contribu-
tions, and unemployment benefit receipt. The inclusion of training spells enables us to
identify the exact time and place of labor market entry for apprentices.
The IEB further contain details on wages and a variety of socio-demographic char-
acteristics. Information on the employer side is added by merging the IEB with the
Establishment History Panel [BHP, cf. Hethey-Maier and Seth (2010)]. The BHP en-
compasses all German establishments with at least one worker employed subject to
social security contributions on June 30th of any given year. Because both data sets are
based on process generated data which is used by Germany’s social security agencies
to compute social security contributions and unemployment benefits, they are highly
reliable.
To enable a long-term perspective on detailed labor market biographies, we restrict
our sample to the cohorts from the years 1978, 1979 and 1980. Cohort membership
is determined by the calendar year in which an apprentice graduates, and graduation
is defined as the last day of the first apprenticeship period recorded in the data. We
further exclude all individuals who are younger than age 15 or older than age 26 when
graduating. Around 5 percent of all selected individuals hold a high school diploma at
the time of graduation. We exclude them from the analyses, too.
728,841 individuals remain in the final sample. We follow their professional careers
over the first 24 years since graduation and define the first eight years as early career
and the last 16 years as prime age. As in Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013), we construct
our key regressor – early-career unemployment – by adding up all the days an indi-
vidual was registered as unemployed during early career. Since apprentices in the dual
system pay contributions to unemployment insurance, they are eligible to receive un-
employment benefits after a qualifying period of one year of training. However, before
the year 2000, the IEB do not contain information on individuals officially registered
as job-seeking at the German Federal Employment Agency. This is why we consider a
worker as unemployed if he receives any unemployment benefit payments.
The dependent variable – prime-age earnings – is constructed by multiplying the
duration of each employment spell in prime age with its corresponding daily gross
wage, deflated to 2005 Euro using the CPI provided by Germany’s Federal Reserve
[cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2012)]. Any type of employment subject to social security
contributions is considered. In case of parallel spells we include only the one with the
highest wage. However, wages in the IEB are top-coded if they exceed the upper earn-
ings limit for statutory pension insurance. In these cases, we use Tobit models to impute
hypothetical uncensored wages. The final measure is the sum of these spell earnings.
We also observe a rich set of characteristics related to the individual and the estab-
lishments from which we construct several control variables. Usually, we extract this
information from the graduation spell to avoid problems that may arise if the control
variables are determined by the key regressor. These controls comprise: the labor mar-
ket entry cohort, the age at graduation, the daily remuneration, the training occupation
as well as the sector, size, and the median wage of the training firm. To capture differ-
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ences in local labor demand at the transition from early career to prime age, we follow
Gregg (2001) and use county-specific unemployment rates prevailing in the district of
the last pre-transition employment spell.5
3. DESCRIPTIVES
Table II gives some descriptive information on the data. The median early-career un-
employment is 15 calendar days, i.e. the majority of young workers did not suffer from
substantial unemployment in the first eight years of their professional life. On average,
members of the group of workers with at least 15 days of early-career unemployment
earn about 535 thousand Euro during their prime age employment period with a stan-
dard deviation of almost 275 thousand. In the higher percentile ranges of the early-career
unemployment distribution mean prime-age earnings follow a monotonic substantial de-
cline. Those who are in the range between the eighth and the ninth decile, – i.e. were
unemployed for 326 to 603 days during their early career – had mean cumulative earn-
ings in their prime age period of about 346 thousand with a standard deviation of 223
thousand. For the group above the 95th percentile of early-career unemployment, mean
cumulative earnings in the prime age period drop to less than 234 thousand Euro. This
is only 44 percent of the mean earnings for those below the median, i.e. workers who
have experienced no or almost no joblessness in their early working life. The standard
deviation of cumulative prime-age earnings decreases in the higher percentile ranges,
but by markedly less than the mean. Hence the coefficient of variation between workers
below the median and those in the top group of early-career unemployment increases
substantially.
Figure 1 shows that early-career unemployment is highly concentrated. On the one
hand, almost half of the workers in our sample did not experience a single day of job-
lessness in the first eight years of their working life. On the other hand, 10 percent
of the workers with the highest incidence of unemployment in their early career were
unemployed for twenty months or longer.6
Figure 2 depicts the cumulative density function for the sum of earnings in the prime
age period. The graph reveals that there is substantial variation in earnings. In our sam-
ple median cumulative prime-age earnings are roughly 0.5 million Euro. The first quar-
tile of this earnings measure is about a quarter of a million, whereas the third quartile
is more than 0.6 million Euro. 10 percent of persons in our sample have cumulative
prime-age earnings exceeding three quarter of a million Euro.7
5See Table VI in the appendix for summary statistics. Further details on data selection and construction of
the control variables can be found in Appendix 8.1 of Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013).
6This result was already shown by Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013) who also find that the distribution
of unemployment accumulated in prime age is even more concentrated than the distribution of early-career
unemployment.
7Some of the numbers underlying Figure 1 and Figure 2 can be found in Table VII of the appendix.
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FIGURE 1.— Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function of Early-career Unem-
ployment
TABLE II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PRIME-AGE EARNINGS BY PERCENTILE RANGE OF EARLY-CAREER
UNEMPLOYMENT
percentile quantiles of prime-age earnings
range early-career unemp. N mean stand. dev. coef. of var.
(in days) (in Euro) (in Euro)
min-median [0-15] 365,168 535,757 274,427 0.51
median-p60 ]15-77] 72,485 471,015 261,419 0.56
p60-p70 ]77-172] 72,647 434,322 256,211 0.59
p70-p80 ]172-326] 72,808 386,763 236,212 0.61
p80-p90 ]326-603] 72,955 345,864 223,360 0.65
p90-p95 ]603-873] 36,352 357,857 269,607 0.75
p95-max ]873-2,886] 36,426 233,952 202,547 0.87
Notes: Own calculations with IEB data.
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FIGURE 2.— Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function of Prime-age Earnings
4. CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
4.1. Possible Confounding Factors
Insofar as early-career unemployment deteriorates existing human capital, prevents
the young worker from the acquisition of productive skills and knowledge or conveys a
negative signal to the labor market, it has a true impact on future earnings. This would
mean that the reduction or absence of unemployment early in professional life would
imply an increase of earnings later on in a causal sense.
Identifying this causal link is not a trivial task. A regression of prime-age earnings
on the duration of early-career unemployment is rather likely plagued with endogeneity
of the explanatory variable. There are at least three reasons for this: First, apprentices
might sort themselves, or might be sorted, into particular firms that offer different ca-
reer opportunities or a different quality of training. For instance, if some workers grad-
uate from firms that provide better career prospects, they will on average experience a
smoother training to work transition and earn higher wages later in life, holding every-
thing else constant.
The second and third reason are related to workers’ mobility taking place during the
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course of the early career.8 The second mechanism that could generate endogeneity of
early-career unemployment starts from the fact that firms may use the training period
as a screening device. As a result they dismiss their least successful graduates if they
expect their costs to outweigh their productivity [cf. Franz and Zimmermann (2002)].
If such a non-prolongation of an employment contract after graduation is interpreted
by potential alternative employers as a sign of low productivity, dismissed workers will
have to face less stable jobs and lower wage offers in the future [cf. Spence (1973);
Gibbons and Katz (1991)].
Finally, the third mechanism is related to the possibility that graduates might leave
the training firm voluntarily in order to form better matches with alternative employers.
If some workers realize higher returns to search than others, they trade off potential
wage gains from job stability during early career against more stable and higher paying
jobs later in life [cf. Neumark (2002)]. It is well documented that the early career is
characterized by a high degree of job mobility in the U.S. [cf. Topel and Ward (1992)].
For German apprentices, job shopping is an almost equally important source of wage
growth [cf. Adda, Dustmann, Meghir and Robin (2013)]. Moreover, Franz (1981) finds a
positive correlation between unemployment duration and initial education in his sample
of German youths, which suggests that pronounced job search or further educational
achievement involve temporary periods of unemployment.
Not appropriately controlling for one of the three mechanisms outlined above can re-
sult in biased estimates of the effect of early-career unemployment on prime-age earn-
ings. Specifically, the presence of initial sorting of workers into highly productive firms
as well as the negative selection of revealed under-performing workers out of firms
would result in an upward bias. By contrast, the presence of voluntary mobility would
induce a downward bias [cf. von Wachter and Bender (2006)].
4.2. Identification Strategy
Our empirical strategy to identify possible long-term earnings losses of early-career
unemployment is to start with a simple OLS regression of prime-age earnings on early-
career unemployment and then to successively control for initial sorting, negative se-
lection, and voluntary mobility. As long as selection between training firms is based on
observables, like wage level and size of the training firm, including our control variables
in the regressions solves the potential problem of sorting. Since it is very common for
German apprentices to live near the firm in dedicated boarding houses during the period
of training, we also control for fixed effects of the training firm’s district. Ultimately, we
replace district fixed effects with fixed effects at the level of the training firm to control
for further invariant firm characteristics which might be of relevance for the process of
sorting but are not included in our data.
Although we have very detailed information on individual employment histories, ex-
plicitly modelling the processes of job shopping and negative selection appears rather
8In our sample, only 19 percent of all apprentices stay with their training firm for the first eight years of
their careers or longer.
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difficult. The route we take here to separate spurious correlations from structural rela-
tionships is to instrument early-career unemployment with the event of a plant closure
of the firm that provided training occurring in the year of graduation.9 If, having con-
trolled for initial sorting, the graduates involved in a plant closure are dismissed due to
an unanticipated and exogenous establishment-specific labor demand shock, this group
of leavers constitutes a random draw from the population. Therefore, applying this strat-
egy should solve the potential problem of voluntary mobility and negative selection.
Since a plant closure can hardly be anticipated earlier than two years in advance [cf.
Hamermesh (1987); Ruhm (1991); Dustmann and Meghir (2005)], we focus on those
graduates who have spent at least two years of training at the firm before the firm closes
down.10
However, the IV strategy requires additional assumptions regarding the process of
initial sorting and the mechanisms through which plant closures impact on the level of
earnings more than eight years later. Since there is virtually no within cohort-firm vari-
ation in plant closures, we cannot control for sorting using firm fixed effects. Therefore,
we have to assume that selection into training firms is based on observable individual
and firm characteristics as well as on invariant unobservable characteristics of the firm’s
local labor market.11
The most critical assumption we require for the IV strategy to identify a local av-
erage treatment effect on the treated is excludability of initial plant closure from the
regression of prime-age earnings. In other words, we have to assume that plant clo-
sures taking place at the time of graduation exhibit a permanent effect on earnings only
via the unemployment experience they induce. The particular channels through which
early-career unemployment ultimately translates into lower earnings can be manifold,
such as negative signalling, human capital depreciation and non-accumulation of work
experience or tenure during unemployment.12 To achieve identification, however, it is
just important that displaced apprenticeship graduates would not have to face worse
labor market outcomes in prime age had they not experienced an elevated amount of
early-career unemployment.
We address these issues of identification in more detail in the next section, which
presents the results of the regression analyses. Although one can never be completely
sure whether the exclusion restriction holds, we find quite robust evidence that OLS
9We identify plant closures in our data by relying on the classification of Hethey and Schmieder (2010),
which is based on worker flows between all German establishments. Specifically, we regard a “small death”,
an “atomized death”, and a “chunky death” according to their classification as the result of a plant closure.
However, our data set provides employer characteristics only at the establishment level. To follow the standard
notation, we use the terms establishment, plant, and firm interchangeably.
10According to Paragraph 22 of Germany’s Vocational Training Act of 1969, it is also very difficult to
change firms during the course of an apprenticeship.
11OLS estimates that control for district fixed effects are very similar to those that control for firm fixed
effects. We are therefore confident that this assumption is satisfied.
12The latter effect would reflect positive returns to experience/tenure. However, disentangling the particu-
lar channels through which scarring actually operates is a highly challenging task which we do not approach
here. The main objective of our study is to separate any form of true state dependence between early-career
unemployment and prime-age earnings from spurious correlations stemming from serially correlated unob-
served heterogeneity.
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estimates of the effect of early-career unemployment on prime-age earnings are not
substantially biased upwards.
5. REGRESSION RESULTS
5.1. Mean Regression Results
Table III contains alternative specifications of the regression of cumulative prime-age
earnings (in logs) on early-career unemployment. The first variant of the specification
gives an estimate of the raw effect whereas the other variants include a more or less
comprehensive bunch of control variables. Note that the number of observations in the
various variants of the specification differs because of imposed restrictions.
Without further controls, the raw effect of one additional day of unemployment in the
early stage of professional life is estimated as−9.69×10−4. This estimate implies that a
standard deviation increase in early-career unemployment (326 days) would reduce av-
erage prime-age earnings by roughly 27 percent. In contrast to the results in column (1)
all further specifications include the age at graduation, the remuneration during the last
year of vocational training, the number of workers and the median wage of the training
firm, dummies for various occupational and industry categories, dummies for the differ-
ent cohorts, and the county-specific unemployment rate prevailing in the district of the
last employment spell prior to the transition from the first eight years of early career to
the prime age period. Additionally, specification (2) includes dummies for the training
firms’ districts. The control variables increase the adjusted coefficient of determination,
adj. R2, from 0.086 to 0.126. The crucial parameter of early-career unemployment in
absolute terms falls slightly (to −9.06×10−4). This would still imply an effect of one
standard deviation of early unemployment on prime-age earnings of roughly minus 25
percent.
Specifications (3) and (4) show that the coefficient of early-career unemployment
also responds only moderately if firm fixed effects are used instead of district fixed ef-
fects. Specification (4) additionally restricts the estimation sample to workers who were
trained at firms with at least 50 employees and five apprentices in the year of gradua-
tion. Again, the result does not change markedly. The effect of a standard deviation of
early-career unemployment on prime-age earnings is still in the order of magnitude of
a 25 percent reduction.
For the same group of persons we study here, Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013) have
shown that early-career unemployment leads to more unemployment later in life. Nev-
ertheless, 60 percent of all workers are not unemployed during prime age. Specification
(5) now only considers those workers without any unemployment spells during prime
time. This not only excludes the effect of unobservables in the characteristics of the
worker that might permanently influence the risk of unemployment, it also provides
an estimate of the scarring effect of early-career unemployment on earnings net of any
effects on future unemployment experience. The result indicates that the coefficient of
early-career unemployment in absolute terms is now markedly reduced. The value of
−4.9× 10−4, however, remains statistically highly significant and still implies a con-
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siderable reduction of prime-age earnings if early-career unemployment is increased by
one standard deviation (about minus 14 percent). One can argue that this effect is likely
an underestimation of the true effect because the imposed restriction leads to a positive
selection. We will return to this point in Section 5.3.
In specification (6), finally, workers were excluded that were unemployed at the tran-
sition from the early career to the prime age period, i.e. in the eighth year after entering
the labor market. This restriction controls for any persistence effects of unemployment
between the two periods. As can be expected, the effect of early-career unemployment
on future earnings is somewhat smaller (−7.37×10−4) as in the baseline specifications
(1) to (4), but still implies an effect of one standard deviation of early-career unemploy-
ment of about minus 21 percent. The imposed restriction, however, not only excludes
the unintended persistence effect but probably also leads to a positive selection.
5.2. Instrumental Variable Regression Results
So far we have shown that prime-age earnings are strongly correlated with early-
career unemployment and that this correlation is not weakened even if we compare
only apprentices who graduated from the same training firm. As outlined in Section 4,
the OLS estimates may not only reflect true scarring effects of early-career unemploy-
ment. They might also pick up spurious correlations stemming from unobserved and
temporally correlated variables. Particularly, voluntary mobility would induce a down-
ward bias and negative selection would induce an upward bias, as long as these factors
are correlated with both early-career unemployment and with prime-age earnings. To
investigate and to solve this potential problem, we now instrument early-career unem-
ployment with the event of a plant closure of the training firm taking place in the year
of graduation.
5.2.1. Assessing Exogeneity of the Instrument
Column (1) of Table IV presents estimates of the first stage, second stage and reduced
form effects of a set of regressions of prime-age earnings or of early-career unemploy-
ment, respectively. Only a constant is included as an additional regressor in this IV
model. Hence in the reduced form we regress prime-age earnings on a dummy vari-
able indicating a plant closure and a constant. The result shows a difference in aver-
age earnings between displaced and non displaced workers of roughly 21 percent. The
corresponding first stage effect is the difference in the average number of days of un-
employment accumulated during the early career between these two groups of workers.
According to this specification, workers displaced at graduation due to plant closure
experience on average almost three extra months of early-career unemployment. A first
stage F-statistic well above the value of ten indicates that problems due to weak instru-
mentation can be ruled out [cf. Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002)]. Like the reduced form
and the first stage effect, the resulting second stage effect is statistically different from
zero at any significance level. Yet, it appears to be unreasonably large.
There might be systematic sorting of individuals between training firms based on
the probability that a firm closes down a few years later. When we include our control
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TABLE III
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF PRIME-AGE EARNINGS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early-career -9.69*** -9.06*** -8.79*** -9.51*** -4.90*** -7.37***
unempl. [×104] (0.063) (0.0557) (0.0691) (0.108) (0.132) (0.103)
Control variables, measured at the time of graduation:
Age 0.0127*** 0.0085*** 0.0138*** 0.0076*** 0.0072***
(0.001) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0012)
Remuneration 0.0067*** 0.0074*** 0.0068*** 0.0032*** 0.0062***
(3.35e-04) (3.61e-04) (4.74e-04) (4.11e-04) (3.63e-04)
Size of training 9.29*** 1.1 1.67 4.57 1.66
firm [×106] (1.35) (9.24) (9.18) (6.94) (9.13)
Median wage of 0.0087*** 0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0001 0.0002
training firm (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0007)
Unskilled manual 0.110*** 0.101** 0.0846* 0.202*** 0.116*
occupation (0.0295) (0.0393) (0.0423) (0.0575) (0.048)
Skilled manual 0.252*** 0.209*** 0.185*** 0.242*** 0.203***
occupation (0.0281) (0.0363) (0.0388) (0.0548) (0.0454)
Technicians 0.330*** 0.345*** 0.325*** 0.370*** 0.335***
and engineers (0.0293) (0.0377) (0.0402) (0.0552) (0.046)
Unskilled 0.0489 0.0701 0.0418 0.181** 0.091
services (0.0309) (0.0419) (0.0505) (0.0637) (0.0512)
Skilled 0.0657* 0.00151 -0.0216 0.0114 -0.0235
services (0.0324) (0.0448) (0.0489) (0.0624) (0.0519)
Semiprofessions 0.451*** 0.335*** 0.316*** 0.337*** 0.310***
and professions (0.0326) (0.044) (0.0472) (0.0576) (0.0495)
Unskilled commercial 0.218*** 0.209*** 0.182*** 0.248*** 0.206***
occupations (0.0291) (0.041) (0.0462) (0.0598) (0.0492)
Skilled commercial 0.400*** 0.340*** 0.333*** 0.363*** 0.339***
occ. and managers (0.0281) (0.0366) (0.0391) (0.0545) (0.0454)
Unemployment 0.0327*** 0.0347*** 0.0335*** 0.0343*** 0.038***
at transition (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.001)
Constant 12.89*** 11.71*** 12.37*** 11.44*** 12.56*** 12.72***
(0.0035) (0.0357) (0.171) (0.564) (0.153) (0.215)
Observations 728,841 728,841 728,841 293,629 432,597 612.189
adj. R2 0.086 0.126 0.078 0.087 0.019 0.038
Further variables in regression:
Cohort dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
District dummies no yes no no no no
Firm dummies no no yes yes yes yes
Sample restrictions:
Train. in large firm no no no yes no no
No prime-age unempl. no no no no yes no
No unempl. in year 8 no no no no no yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the level of the training firm are in paren-
theses; * , (**), [***] indicates significance at the 5, (1), [0.1] % level. Refer-
ence group for occupations: agricultural occ. For variable definitions see Section 2.
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variables and fixed effects for the training firm’s location to control for initial sorting in
column (2), the reduced form effect decreases to statistically still significant 9 percent
and the first stage effect drops to about two extra months of unemployment. This pattern
suggests that individuals with a below-average earning potential are trained at firms
with an above-average probability to close down a few years later. Having controlled
for this sorting effect, IV estimates a second stage effect of early-career unemployment
on prime-age earnings that is considerably smaller than the one presented in column (1).
However, it is still statistically and economically significant.
If it was possible to correctly predict the likelihood of a plant closure, there might
be further room for some strategic behavior to avoid starting an apprenticeship at a
dying firm. To rule out this possibility, we exclude apprentices with less than two years
of training in the specification displayed in column (3) of Table IV.13 While, relative to
model (2) of the same table, the reduced form effect hardly changes, the first stage effect
decreases to one and a half months but remains statistically significant. As a result, the
second stage effect somewhat increases and anticipation effects do not seem to induce
an upward bias.
A further check of whether the instrument is as good as randomly assigned is to
estimate specification (3) of Table IV by firm size. As is shown by von Wachter and
Bender (2006), wage losses caused by an early displacement reflect losses of firm size
wage premia. Consequently, we should find strong reduced form effects for appren-
tices who were displaced from large training firms. Apprentices who had to leave small
training firms, in contrast, should show persistent reduced form effects only if displace-
ments were endogenous. Results from an IV model restricted to individuals who were
trained at firms with at least 50 employees and five apprentices in the year of gradu-
ation are shown in column (4) of Table IV. Column (5) contains the same results for
those apprentices who graduated from firms with less than 50 employees and less than
five apprentices. For workers who were displaced from large training firms, prime-age
earnings losses are on average 14 percent. This effect is significant at the 5 percent level
although only 185 individuals are treated in this group. In the latter group, 2,124 indi-
viduals are treated. These workers suffer only 3.8 percent earnings losses in prime age.
The effect is no longer statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. This result
not only supports exogeneity of the instrument but also suggests that losses of firm size
wage premia are an important factor behind the local scarring effect of early-career un-
employment identified by IV. Of course, identification is only achieved if the exclusion
restriction holds as well.
5.2.2. Assessing Excludability of the Instrument
The exclusion restriction might be problematic for at least three reasons: First, if ex-
ogenously displaced apprentices loose significant amounts of human capital specific to
13Despite the absence of wage reductions, Fackler, Schnabel and Wagner (2013) report for Germany that
exiting establishments somewhat shrink already more than two years before closure relative to a matched
sample of surviving establishments. Focusing on establishments that are still willing to train new apprentices
two years before they close down should also mitigate this potential source of endogeneity.
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their training firm they will suffer permanent earnings losses simply because they are
no longer as productive at other firms compared to similar apprentices who had the
possibility to stay with their training firm. However, Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010)
demonstrate that human capital is highly transferable between occupations and is rather
bound to carrying out a specific task. This is particularly the case for apprenticeship
training which develops, contrary to common perceptions, general rather than firm-
specific skills [cf. Winkelmann (1996); Harhoff and Kane (1997)].
Correlation of plant closure at the time of graduation with persistent initial match
quality stemming from other sources than early-career unemployment constitutes a sec-
ond potential violation of the exclusion restriction. As pointed out by Neumark (2002),
the direction of bias in the IV estimates depends on the sign of this correlation. If, for
instance, displaced workers permanently accept lower-paid jobs as a direct consequence
of an early layoff, IV estimates would absorb this additional effect and would therefore
be biased upwards.
As an indirect test for whether directly induced differences in initial match quality
persist over more than eight years of potential experience, Neumark (2002) suggests to
restrict the analysis to workers who have changed their employer during the course of
the early career. The reasoning is that, if such persistent differences in initial match qual-
ity cause an upward bias in the IV estimates, this upward bias should be comparatively
smaller in the sample of mobile workers. To see whether this is the case, we re-estimate
specification (3) of Table IV for the sub-sample of workers who have experienced at
least one change of employer with an intervening period of joblessness no longer than
three weeks during the early career. Recalls are also excluded from this definition of
direct employer changes. Reflecting the early career’s pronounced job dynamics, al-
most 54 percent of workers remain in the sample. The share of mobile workers among
the initially displaced is with almost 64 percent remarkably higher. The OLS estimate
of the scarring effect in the full sample is −8.2× 10−4. The corresponding IV second
stage estimate is −18.5× 10−4. While an one standard deviation increase of early un-
employment would reduce average prime-age earnings in the former case by roughly
23 percent, this effect almost doubles to 45 percent in the latter case. In the sample of
mobile workers, the estimated coefficient of early-career unemployment is −8.4×10−4
for OLS, and −20.7× 10−4 for IV [column (6) of Table IV]. The implied effects of
one standard deviation of early unemployment on prime-age earnings are about minus
24 percent and minus 49 percent, respectively. Consequently, the bias implied by the
difference between the IV and the OLS estimates is not smaller in the sample of mobile
workers than in the full sample.
Third, almost 40 percent of apprentices who are involved in plant closures at the time
of graduation are immediately reemployed, and two thirds are in employment subject to
social security contributions within one month or less.14 If displaced but immediately
reemployed workers perform similar as would have been the case in the absence of an
initial plant closure, these never takers would not contribute to the IV estimate and the
14In contrast, for those 9 percent of apprentices who stay the longest time without employment after
displacement it takes at least one year to find new employment.
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exclusion restriction would not be violated. However, even without an intermediate spell
of unemployment, some displaced workers might still suffer worse labor market condi-
tions later in life if they permanently lower their reservation wage as a consequence of
the take-over experience itself. Moreover, their displacement probabilities might now be
higher because they do not have insider status and could not be screened during training.
To explore potential bias arising from immediate take-overs, we include a dummy
variable indicating the absence of an initial period of unemployment if the apprentice
was displaced from his training firm into specification (3) of Table IV. The results are
displayed in column (7) of Table IV. The difference in average prime-age earnings be-
tween the displaced and the non-displaced is now around 11 percent. Displaced workers
are on average more than five months longer unemployed during the early career. The
IV second stage estimate of early-career unemployment drops to −7.1× 10−4, which
is even smaller in magnitude than the corresponding OLS estimate of −8.2×10−4 (not
reported in the table). The implied effect of an one standard deviation increase of early-
career unemployment on the mean of prime-age earnings is minus 20.7 percent, which
is still substantial. Note, however, that unemployment at a later point in the early career
could also be a delayed reaction to an initial plant closure. If this delayed unemployment
experience, in turn, results in future earnings loss, it is part of the scarring effect and the
exclusion restriction would not be violated. Explicitly controlling for direct take-over
therefore could also switch off some of the channels through which scarring actually
operates. In any case, even if the exclusion restriction was violated, the associated bias
does not appear to be large enough to explain the finding of economically significant
scarring effects of early-career unemployment on prime-age earnings.
5.2.3. Interpreting the Instrumental Variable Regression Results
IV produces point estimates of the scarring effect of early-career unemployment that
are usually larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. Three mechanisms could ex-
plain this finding: First, if plant closure of the training firm is a valid instrument for
early-career unemployment, larger IV estimates imply downward biased OLS estimates.
As outlined above, such a downward bias arises if, for instance, early job shopping ac-
tivities involve temporary periods of unemployment but improve labor market outcomes
in the future [cf. Neumark (2002)]. An alternative explanation could be the presence of
attenuation bias induced by classical measurement error in early-career unemployment.
Second, in the case of heterogenous scarring effects, IV estimates a treatment effect
for the subpopulation of compliers, i.e. an effect for those workers who experienced an
elevated amount of early-career unemployment only because their training firm had to
close down. In our application, it appears reasonable to assume that less skilled workers
with lower reemployment probabilities are overrepresented among the group of compli-
ers. As we will show in the next section, scarring effects substantially decrease across
the distribution of prime-age earnings. It is therefore not surprising that a local average
scarring effect estimated by IV exceeds the corresponding OLS estimate.15
15Appendix 8.4 of Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013) provides further evidence that scarring effects are not
the same for everybody. In the presence of heterogenous scarring effects, however, the IV estimates presented
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Third, given the results presented above, we are quite confident that the instrument is
as good as randomly assigned once sorting between training firms is taken into account.
Although we find no evidence that violations of the exclusion restriction invalidate the
finding of significant and long-lasting scarring effects, we can never be completely sure
that IV estimates are not biased upwards. Note, however, that the IV estimates are quite
imprecise and that the null of exogeneity of early-career unemployment cannot be re-
jected at the 1 percent significance level in the majority of cases.16 If early-career un-
employment is in fact exogenous in a regression of prime-age earnings, however, OLS
estimates are not only consistent but also efficient. We therefore treat early-career un-
employment as exogenous throughout the remaining part of this paper.
5.3. Scarring Effect Heterogeneity Across the Earnings Distribution
Workers who do generally well in the labor market might react very differently to
early unemployment experiences compared to workers who perform rather poorly. To
explore this possibility we now investigate whether the scarring effect of early-career
unemployment varies across the unconditional distribution of prime-age earnings. For
this purpose, we run regressions of the recentered influence function (RIF) of each un-
conditional decile of cumulative prime-age earnings [cf. Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux
(2009)]. The models’ specification is identical to the one in column (2) of Table III.
However, a coefficient estimated using RIF regression can be interpreted as the par-
tial effect that a regressor has on the specified unconditional quantile of the prime-age
earnings distribution.
The estimated effects of early-career unemployment on each decile of prime-age
earnings are presented in the upper panel of Table V. Early-career unemployment has
a significant negative effect on each decile. These effects are substantially larger at the
lower than at the upper tail: At the first decile, an increase of early-career unemploy-
ment by one standard deviation (326 days) reduces prime-age earnings by 56 percent.
The corresponding scarring effect on the median is 11 percent and at the ninth decile it
is roughly 7 percent.17
We further restrict the quantile regression analysis to the 60 percent of workers who
managed to completely avoid unemployment during prime age. This positive selection
probably induces a downward bias. The true scarring effects of early-career unemploy-
ment on earnings net of its effects on unemployment should therefore be bounded by the
effects for the full sample (first panel of Table V) and for the selected sample (second
panel of Table V). At the bottom of the prime-age earnings distribution, earnings losses
in this paper may be interpreted as upper bounds for the average treatment effect on the treated.
16Neither a potential downward bias in OLS estimates nor the sum of a complier effect and a potential
upward bias in IV estimates appear to be – in absolute terms – large enough to lead to a rejection of the null
in these cases.
17The corresponding effects on the conditional distribution of prime-age earnings are similar in magnitude
and decrease across this distribution, too. They are presented in Table VIII in the Appendix. Decreasing
scarring effects within training firms, training occupations and industry sectors provide some evidence that
the revealed pattern is the result of a fundamental segmentation of the labor market rather than of a persistent
demand shock hitting firms, occupations and industries in different ways.
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from unemployment experienced early in professional life are still substantial even if ex-
posure to unemployment during prime age is avoided. But the effects decrease rapidly
as we move up the earnings distribution: An increase of early-career unemployment by
one standard deviation (in the full sample) reduces the first decile of prime-age earn-
ings for this selected group of workers by 45 percent, the median by 4.5 percent, and
the ninth decile by 3.1 percent. Consequently, workers with a low earnings potential but
without any prime-age unemployment still suffer substantial earnings losses from early-
career unemployment. On the contrary, workers with a high earnings potential and who
avoid repeated exposure to unemployment manage to almost completely offset these
negative scarring effects.
In the final step of our quantile regression analysis, we return to the full sample of
workers but additionally include early-career unemployment squared in the RIF regres-
sions of prime-age earnings. We therefore allow the scarring effect not only to vary
across the unconditional distribution of prime-age earnings but also by the duration of
early-career unemployment. The estimated coefficients on our key regressor are dis-
played in the third panel of Table V. The emerging earnings–unemployment profiles,
with all other coefficients of the model set to zero, are depicted for selected deciles in
Figure 3. The scarring effects seem to be almost linear in the duration of early-career
unemployment at the tails of the prime-age earnings distribution. In the middle of this
distribution they are even slightly convex. We conclude from these patterns that the
linearity assumption imposed so far provides a sufficient approximation for modeling
the conditional mean or unconditional quantile functions of prime-age earnings, respec-
tively.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed administrative linked employer-employee data on more than 720,000
German males who graduated from Germany’s dual apprenticeship system during the
years 1978, 1979, and 1980 to see whether unemployment experienced early in profes-
sional life permanently reduces earnings accumulated during prime age.
OLS estimates controlling for training firm fixed effects and for other initial condi-
tions suggest that an increase of unemployment within the first eight years since labor
market entry by one standard deviation (326 days) reduces average earnings in the fol-
lowing 16 years by almost 25 percent, other things being equal. For the 60 percent of
workers who avoided exposure to unemployment during their prime age period, this
earnings loss drops to 14 percent, which is still substantial.
Yet, beyond large earnings losses on average, we also observe that workers who per-
form generally well in the labor market manage to overcome the adverse effects of
early-career unemployment to a large extent. This is particularly the case if they avoid
further exposure to unemployment. Other workers, in contrast, suffer substantial earn-
ings losses, even if the analysis is restricted to those who experience no unemployment
during their prime age period.
We applied an instrumental variable strategy based on plant closure of the firm where
the apprentice was trained taking place in the year of his graduation. This approach
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FIGURE 3.— Prime-age Earnings and Early-career Unemployment Profiles by Earn-
ings Decile
Notes: Earnings–unemployment profiles by decile of prime-age earnings based on coefficients estimated by unconditional quantile regressions. Unconditional quantile
regressions are performed with Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux’s (2009) recentered influence function procedure. Model specifications are similar to column (2) of Table III but
additionally include early-career unemployment squared; The coefficients on the control variables are set to zero; For variable definitions see Section 2.
yields estimates of the scarring effect that are, albeit generally larger in magnitude, not
statistically different from the corresponding OLS estimates. We thoroughly discussed
and investigated the assumptions under which this strategy identifies a local average
treatment effect on the treated and found no evidence that potential violations could
explain the finding of economically significant and long-lasting scarring effects.
The overall evidence suggests that the duration of early-career unemployment can
be treated as exogenous in our regressions of prime-age earnings. One explanation for
this finding is that we focus on a quite homogenous group of workers. These workers
face a severe recession as a consequence of the second oil price shock early in pro-
fessional life. This is probably the main driving force behind the early unemployment
experiences. Consistent with our view, Franz (1981) shows that demand side factors are
the major determinant of youth unemployment durations in Germany, while individual
characteristics are only of minor importance.
A policy that aims at preventing the emergence of youth unemployment or at least
reduces its duration is highly supported because our results indicate that substantial
income losses in the subsequent professional life would be avoided. This is particularly
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the case for workers with a low earnings potential. A policy initiative against youth
unemployment is therefore not only a measure for increasing prime-age earnings on
average, it would also tend to reduce the inequality in the income distribution.
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7. APPENDIX
LONG-TERM EARNINGS SCARS FROM YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT 25
TA
B
L
E
V
I.
—
SU
M
M
A
RY
ST
A
T
IS
T
IC
S
N
m
ea
n
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
m
in
im
um
m
ax
im
um
Pr
im
e-
ag
e
ea
rn
in
gs
(i
n
lo
gs
)
72
8,
84
1
12
.7
1.
1
2.
6
14
.7
E
ar
ly
-c
ar
ee
ru
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
72
8,
84
1
18
4.
7
32
5.
9
0
2,
88
6
Pl
an
tc
lo
su
re
at
gr
ad
ua
tio
n
72
8,
57
3
0.
00
8
–
0
1
C
la
ss
of
19
79
72
8,
84
1
0.
33
6
–
0
1
C
la
ss
of
19
80
72
8,
84
1
0.
35
0
–
0
1
A
ge
at
gr
ad
ua
tio
n
72
8,
84
1
18
.7
1.
7
15
26
R
em
un
er
at
io
n
at
gr
ad
ua
tio
n
72
8,
84
1
10
.9
5.
8
0.
01
17
6.
6
Tr
ai
ni
ng
oc
cu
pa
tio
n
re
fe
re
nc
e:
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
lo
cc
.
un
sk
ill
ed
m
an
ua
lo
cc
.
72
8,
84
1
0.
07
9
–
0
1
sk
ill
ed
m
an
ua
lo
cc
.
72
8,
84
1
0.
66
8
–
0
1
te
ch
ni
ci
an
s
an
d
en
gi
ne
er
s
72
8,
84
1
0.
03
5
–
0
1
un
sk
ill
ed
se
rv
ic
es
72
8,
84
1
0.
01
6
–
0
1
sk
ill
ed
se
rv
ic
es
72
8,
84
1
0.
01
3
–
0
1
se
m
ip
ro
fe
ss
io
ns
an
d
pr
of
es
si
on
s
72
8,
84
1
0.
01
6
–
0
1
un
sk
ill
ed
co
m
m
er
ci
al
oc
c.
72
8,
84
1
0.
02
7
–
0
1
sk
ill
ed
co
m
m
er
ci
al
oc
c.
an
d
m
an
ag
er
s
72
8,
84
1
0.
12
8
–
0
1
Si
ze
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
fir
m
72
8,
84
1
98
7.
2
4,
49
1
1
57
,2
36
M
ed
ia
n
w
ag
e
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
fir
m
72
8,
84
1
38
.1
9.
0
1.
2
78
.4
Se
ct
or
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
fir
m
re
fe
re
nc
e:
ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
en
er
gy
an
d
m
in
in
g
72
8,
84
1
0.
02
5
–
0
1
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
72
8,
84
1
0.
49
8
–
0
1
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
72
8,
84
1
0.
17
6
–
0
1
tr
ad
e
72
8,
84
1
0.
13
5
–
0
1
tr
an
sp
or
ta
nd
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
72
8,
84
1
0.
03
3
–
0
1
fin
an
ci
al
in
te
rm
ed
ia
tio
n
72
8,
84
1
0.
02
3
–
0
1
ot
he
rs
er
vi
ce
s
72
8,
84
1
0.
07
7
–
0
1
no
n-
pr
ofi
ts
an
d
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
72
8,
84
1
0.
00
3
–
0
1
pu
bl
ic
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
72
8,
84
1
0.
01
8
–
0
1
L
oc
al
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tr
at
e
at
tr
an
si
tio
n
72
8,
84
1
9.
0
3.
5
0.
9
19
.8
N
ot
es
:O
w
n
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
w
ith
IE
B
da
ta
.
26 JOACHIM MO¨LLER AND MATTHIAS UMKEHRER
TABLE VII
SELECTED MOMENTS OF THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF EARLY-CAREER UNEMPLOYMENT AND PRIME-AGE
EARNINGS
Early-career unemployment (in days) Prime-age earnings (in 2005 Euro)
mean 185 461,360
standard deviation 326 274,190
minimum 0 13.33
maximum 2,886 2,350,436
percentile quantile
5 0 34,383
10 0 81,893
15 0 137,602
20 0 198,119
25 0 260,760
30 0 321,533
35 0 374,745
40 0 415,297
45 0 446,503
50 15 472,192
55 43 495,860
60 77 519,371
65 119 544,117
70 172 571,554
75 242 603,838
80 326 644,116
85 431 700,393
90 603 801,721
95 873 977,323
Notes: Own calculations with IEB data; Number of observations: 728,841.
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